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NOTES
PROGRAMMED DEFAMATION: APPLYING § 230
OF THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT TO
RECOMMENDATION SYSTEMS
Michael R. Bartels*
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act was originally intended
to promote online innovation for the good faith moderation of interactive
computer services. Since Congress enacted the statute, innovators,
flourishing under statutory immunity, have been able to master the
technological frontier, with most web traffic now consumed through highly
curated and specialized feeds resembling a personal newspaper. The
resulting free market of information is stronger than at any point in human
history.
The new technological regime, however, has created another problem.
Most of the content shared on these platforms originates from third parties,
often anonymous or judgment-proof. Section 230, meanwhile, protects social
media sites from liability as the publishers or speakers of such information.
Although the websites develop the content by displaying it to others, they are
generally not considered responsible for what comes from a third party. In
this regime, defamation spreads quickly and easily, and plaintiffs have little
legal recourse for relief.
This Note contends that social media sites’ increasingly frequent use of
recommendation algorithms to sort content for users should not be afforded
§ 230 immunity against liability. The creation of a recommendation feed,
this Note argues, should be treated as a second creation point for which the
interactive computer service should be held entirely responsible. This Note
also contends that such a result may be achieved through judicial application
of § 230 to the recommendation feeds as their own products, rather than
amending the statute. Accordingly, this Note further contends that the
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allowance of liability against such systems could drive technological
innovation toward addressing the dangers of online defamation and assign
responsibility for the content on one’s platform.
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INTRODUCTION
Uzoma Igbonwa never learned the identities behind the fake profiles who
defamed him.1 A native Nigerian, Igbonwa found himself the target of two
unknown Facebook users operating under aliases in May of 2016.2 The users
employed a Facebook page, operated by a third-party user with an alias, to
spread falsehoods about Igbonwa; he alleged that moderators designed the
forum to harm his reputation.3 The posters alleged crimes and unflattering
details about the plaintiff’s personal life, accusing him of money laundering
and beating his wife.4 According to Igbonwa, by the time the District Court
for the Northern District of California addressed his case more than two years
later, unknown people still continued to humiliate him; the accusations were
apparently so severe that they prompted threats to his life.5 Despite his
hardship, Igbonwa could not confront the accusations, as he could not find
the people who posted the lies.6 Unable to pursue claims against the
unknown tortfeasors, Igbonwa joined Facebook and Mark Zuckerberg as
defendants in his civil suit and advanced his case as a pro se plaintiff.7
Despite Igonbwa’s efforts to save his reputation and clear his name,
Facebook never had to address his case.8 Because Igbonwa never alleged
that Facebook created the content in question, § 230 of the Communications
Decency Act of 19969 (CDA) barred all of his claims against the site and its
creator.10
Section 230 is a federal statute that has been interpreted to give many
online platforms broad protections against liability for their content, so long
as another person posted that content.11 In most other forms of media, such
as newspapers, a publisher who repeats a third-party-sourced statement, even
when attributing the statement to the original source, risks triggering liability
for its veracity.12 Publishers may even be held liable if they expressly deny
the truth of a third-party libel but still reprint the statement.13 This principle

1. Igbonwa v. Facebook, Inc., No. 18-cv-02027, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173769, at *3
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2018).
2. Id. at *2.
3. Id. at *2–3.
4. Id.
5. Id. at *4.
6. Id.
7. Id. at *1.
8. See generally id.
9. Pub. L. No. 104-104, tit. V, 110 Stat. 56, 133–43 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 18 and 47 U.S.C.).
10. Igbonwa, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173769, at *14.
11. ELLEN P. GOODMAN & RYAN WHITTINGTON, GERMAN MARSHALL FUND, SECTION 230
OF THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT AND THE FUTURE OF ONLINE SPEECH 2 (2019),
https://www.gmfus.org/publications/section-230-communications-decency-act-and-futureonline-speech [https://perma.cc/9F5Y-QLDS].
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 (AM. L. INST. 1977).
13. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Online Defamation, Legal Concepts, and the Good
Samaritan, 51 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2016); see also Cianci v. New Times Publ’g Co., 639 F.2d
54, 60–61 (2d Cir. 1980).
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is known as the “republication rule.”14 The same rules apply to television
and radio, which face even steeper penalties for their own defamation
because of the high volume of information they process and distribute.15
Modern social media sites produce more data in seconds than a television
network could possibly dream of distributing;16 under the traditional rules for
libel and defamation, such a site would trigger enormous liability for content
that others post through their services.17 Section 230, however, lifts the
impossible burden of traditional tort law from the shoulders of many websites
by crafting a large exception.18 Under § 230, any “interactive computer
service” (ICS) cannot be held liable as the “publisher or speaker” of content
originating from a third-party “information content provider” (ICP).19 An
ICS can be defined extremely broadly20 but is generally understood to
encompass all websites,21 including such diverse services as Facebook,22
Google,23 AOL,24 and Grindr.25 ICPs include “any person or entity that is
responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of
information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer
service.”26 Section 230 broadly prevents most websites from incurring
liability for problematic third-party content by dictating that they shall not be
recognized as its original publishers or speakers.27 Such protections also

14. Zipursky, supra note 13, at 4.
15. Anthony Ciolli, Chilling Effects: The Communications Decency Act and the Online
Marketplace of Ideas, 63 U. MIA. L. REV. 137, 143–44 (2008).
16. See Bernard Marr, How Much Data Do We Create Every Day?: The Mind-Blowing
Stats Everyone Should Read, FORBES (May 21, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
bernardmarr/2018/05/21/how-much-data-do-we-create-every-day-the-mind-blowing-statseveryone-should-read/#161f1c1860ba [https://perma.cc/H9RA-9C9G].
17. GOODMAN & WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 2.
18. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c).
19. See id.
20. Id. § 230(f)(2) (“The term ‘interactive computer service’ means any information
service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by
multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides
access to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational
institutions.”).
21. Universal Commc’n Sys. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 419 (1st Cir. 2007) (“A web
site, such as the Raging Bull site, ‘enables computer access by multiple users to a computer
server,’ namely, the server that hosts the web site. Therefore, web site operators, such as
Lycos, are providers of interactive computer services within the meaning of Section 230.”
(quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2))).
22. Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 64 (2d Cir. 2019).
23. Bennett v. Google, Inc., No. 16-cv-02283, 2017 WL 2692607, at *2 (D.D.C. June 21,
2017) (“[I]t has long been held across jurisdictions that Google qualifies as an interactive
computer service under Section 230(c)(1).”).
24. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc. (Zeran II), 129 F.3d 327, 330 n.2 (4th Cir. 1997) (“The
parties do not dispute that AOL falls within the CDA’s ‘interactive computer service’
definition . . . .” (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3))).
25. Herrick v. Grindr LLC, 765 F. App’x 586, 590 (2d Cir. 2019) (“[W]e see no error in
the district court’s conclusion that Grindr is an ICS.”).
26. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3).
27. Id. § 230(c).
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apply where the site takes pains to moderate content posted by others in a
way usually considered editorial.28
Within these broad protections, courts have also recognized that sourcing
tortious content to a third party does not always absolve a third-party host of
responsibility.29 Where websites materially contribute to third-party
content,30 actively solicit it,31 or act in a way that cannot be classified as
publishing or speaking,32 circuit courts have found them responsible for
content even though a third party still contributed it. While these cases may
have been easier to explore when § 230 was enacted, modern advancements
have spurred ICS interaction with user content far beyond the passive bulletin
boards of the mid-1990s.33 Perhaps the most advanced are modern social
media sites, many of which use a recommendation system operated by a
machine-learning algorithm to produce personalized compilations of user
posts.34
The content at issue under § 230 is mind-boggling in scope. On Facebook
alone, 510,000 comments are posted and 293,000 statuses are updated every
minute.35 Under current interpretations of § 230, every asserted fact,
thought, musing, and proposition contained in this rapidly proliferating
content exists under a modified defamation liability regime by virtue of its
being hosted by an ICS.36
This Note explores whether the product of a machine-learning algorithm,
such as that of social media giant, Facebook, should render an ICS its own
ICP, therefore leaving this massive flood of content largely unprotected by
§ 230. This Note argues that recommendation systems should be held
responsible as the ICPs of the additional layers of development they afford
to defamatory content, such as inclusion in a recommendation feed. Part I
summarizes the background of § 230 and its subsequent interpretation by the
courts. It also describes how modern recommendation algorithms, widely
employed by websites claiming § 230 protections, have changed from the
28. Id. § 230(c)(2) (“No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held
liable on account of—(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or
availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious,
filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material
is constitutionally protected . . . .”).
29. See infra Part I.
30. Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1166 (9th Cir. 2008) (en
banc).
31. FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1198–200 (10th Cir. 2009).
32. Oberdorf v. Amazon.com Inc., 930 F.3d 136, 153 (3d Cir. 2019) (“[T]o the extent that
Oberdorf’s negligence and strict liability claims rely on Amazon’s role as an actor in the sales
process, they are not barred by the CDA. However, to the extent that Oberdorf is alleging that
Amazon failed to provide or to edit adequate warnings regarding the use of the dog collar, we
conclude that that activity falls within the publisher’s editorial function. . . . [T]hese failure
to warn claims are barred by the CDA.”).
33. See infra Part I.B.
34. How News Feed Works, FACEBOOK HELP CTR., https://www.facebook.com/help/
1155510281178725 [https://perma.cc/EX3D-92VT] (last visited Oct. 3, 2020).
35. Marr, supra note 16.
36. See Zipursky, supra note 13, at 4.
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simple online forums which prompted § 230’s inclusion in the CDA. Part II
describes the various arguments for and against continuing § 230 protections
of websites that employ recommendation algorithms in constructing original
feeds of third-party content for each individual user. Part III proposes that a
recommendation system, using the example of the Facebook News Feed, can
be ultimately responsible for its own content and, therefore, not subject to
§ 230 protections.
I. SECTION 230 AND THE RECOMMENDATION FEED EXPLAINED
This part discusses the origins of § 230 and the developments that have
created the legal gray area in which recommendation systems reside. Part
I.A discusses how § 230 was enacted. Part I.B elaborates on the ways in
which subsequent court interpretations have expanded and limited its
protections. Part I.C then provides context for the expanding framework of
recommendation systems that could soon be influenced by those same
interpretations.
A. Section 230
This section discusses defamation law’s application online before § 230’s
passage, as well as the statute’s enactment. While traditional defamation law
punished republication of a libel,37 § 230 gave some protections against that
rule to online services that otherwise risked liability by innovatively
moderating their sites.38
1. Online Defamation Before § 230
Section 230 began as a reaction to what contemporaries saw as the stifling
effect of tort liability and, specifically, defamation liability, for third-party
user content hosted on the internet. Before § 230, online platforms faced a
dilemma in which they could only escape liability for third-party content
posted on their sites by completely abstaining from moderation or curation
of the content on their sites.39 For businesses, this meant that no innovation
to mold an online space was possible without massive risk.40 For the general
public, this meant that highly offensive content would permeate most of the
rapidly developing internet.41
The tension was best exemplified by two cases that were decided before
§ 230’s passing, reflecting opposite aspects of the same issue.42 The first
case, Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc.,43 protected a website that did not
moderate its content from legal accountability for content it hosted.
37. See Cianci v. New Times Publ’g Co., 639 F.2d 54, 60–61 (2d Cir. 1980); see also
Zipursky, supra note 13, at 4.
38. See infra Parts I.A.2–3.
39. GOODMAN & WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 4.
40. Ciolli, supra note 15, at 147–48.
41. Id. at 148.
42. GOODMAN & WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 4.
43. 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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CompuServe did not moderate its sites, which the Southern District of New
York claimed protected the site from liability as a publisher.44 In the second
case, Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Services Co.,45 the New York Supreme
Court found a website liable for defamatory statements posted on a bulletin
board it hosted. Because the site took pains to moderate content on the
platform, the New York court reasoned that it had exercised editorial
discretion, triggering liability for the content its fora hosted after curation.46
These two cases applied traditional notions of publishing to nontraditional
platforms and created a lopsided incentive to turn a blind eye to destructive
activity in the process.47 Sites that took no action to protect their platforms
from undesirable content completely insulated themselves from liability.48
Conversely, a site that made a good faith effort to curate its content—even if
its efforts could not have stopped tortious conduct—rendered itself a
“publisher” vulnerable to suit.49 The result, contemporaries feared, would
have disincentivized curation of harmful content by the providers in the best
position to stop it if adopted by other jurisdictions.50
2. Congress Writes an Exception
Congress enacted § 230 shortly after Stratton to eliminate that
disincentive.51 While Congress recognized that ICSs needed protection from
liability to confidently police their content, it also recognized that many sites
lacked the technology or resources to effectively do so.52 Section 230’s
primary purpose was to curtail the negative effects of Stratton and other
potential cases like it.53 The provision’s title, “Protection for ‘Good
Samaritan’ blocking and screening of offensive material,” says volumes
about its purpose, which was to provide “Good Samaritan” protections to any

44. See id. at 135.
45. No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995), superseded by statute,
Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 509, 110 Stat. 56, 137–39, as
recognized in Shiamili v. Real Est. Grp. of N.Y., Inc., 952 N.E.2d 1011 (N.Y. 2011).
46. See id. at *4.
47. See GOODMAN & WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 4.
48. See Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 135.
49. See Stratton, 1995 WL 323710, at *4.
50. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(3)–(5); see also 141 CONG. REC. 22,044–45 (1995) (statement
of Rep. Charles Cox).
51. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A).
52. See Olivier Sylvain, Discriminatory Designs on User Data, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND.
INST. (Apr. 1, 2018), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/discriminatory-designs-user-data
[https://perma.cc/FWL5-59M2]. The Stratton court also recognized the impossibility of
monitoring every third-party post with traditional editorial scrutiny but decided that it was
irrelevant to applying defamation law. See Stratton, 1995 WL 323710, at *4 (“That such
control is not complete . . . does not minimize or eviscerate the simple fact that PRODIGY has
uniquely arrogated to itself the role of determining what is proper for its members to post and
read on its bulletin boards.”).
53. S. REP. NO. 104-230, at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (“One of the specific purposes of this
section is to overrule Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy and any other similar decisions which have
treated such providers and users as publishers or speakers of content that is not their own
because they have restricted access to objectionable material.”).
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ICS that exercised modest discretion to restrict objectionable content.54
Rather than punish the ICS with liability for attempting to create a family
friendly environment, legislators wanted to bolster its efforts with rewards
for taking on the risk of content moderation to help users in distress.55
3. The Text of § 230
Section 230 protects, among other things, “any action voluntarily taken in
good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or
user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent,
harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is
constitutionally protected.”56 While the statute eliminates incentives against
content moderation, it imposes no obligation to moderate and, in fact,
insulates an ICS from liability for failure to do so.57
Section 230’s protections, importantly, only apply to an ICS when a third
party provides its content.58 An ICP provides content when it is “responsible,
in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information provided
through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.”59 If an ICS
is responsible for its own content, then it could lose § 230 protections for its
actions because it would then be responsible for the information connected
to users by its service.60
B. Judicial Interpretation of § 230
This section discusses the various significant court cases interpreting § 230
and how they have expanded, or restrained, its broad protections. The
discussion begins with the first case to expansively interpret § 230’s
protections for an ICS and contrasts it with the first case to articulate § 230’s
limitations. This section then identifies other key cases from circuit courts
that have further developed these limitations in ways potentially applicable
to a recommendation system.
1. The Foundational Case: Zeran
Ever since § 230’s enactment, courts have interpreted the statute broadly,
providing nearly unlimited immunity for ICSs when third parties do harm
through their conduits. These broad interpretations began with Zeran v.
54. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c); see also S. REP. NO. 104-230, at 194 (“This section provides
‘Good Samaritan’ protections from civil liability for providers or users of an interactive
computer service for actions to restrict or to enable restriction of access to objectionable online
material.”); see also Luke 10:25–37 (King James) (originating the term “Good Samaritan” as
one who risks harm by extending help to another in distress). The only obligation that § 230
imposes on an ICS is to notify users of commercially available parental controls, and even this
provision only applies in a way the ICS deems appropriate. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(d).
55. See S. REP. NO. 104-230, at 194.
56. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A).
57. See id. § 230.
58. Id. § 230(c)(1).
59. Id. § 230(f)(3).
60. See id.; see also supra Part I.B.2.
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America Online, Inc.61 In this case, a third party had advertised plaintiff
Kenneth Zeran as a sales contact for offensive shirts referring to the 1995
Oklahoma City bombings, including his first name and phone number in the
post.62 The advertisements were posted on a bulletin board feature of a
website operated by AOL, similar to the Prodigy Services board in Stratton.63
Because of the defamatory posting, Zeran received several calls to his home,
including some threatening his life.64 A radio station even discovered the
posting and, believing it to be true, broadcast it to listeners, encouraging them
to call Zeran’s home.65 Zeran contacted website representatives about the
issue; they repeatedly said that the posting account would be taken down.66
Although the initial post was eventually removed, it continued to reappear
across AOL’s site, generating a steady stream of harassment for Zeran.67 At
the height of the reaction, he received harassing phone calls every two
minutes.68 Zeran eventually responded by bringing a claim against AOL as
a distributor, instead of a publisher, of the information, reasoning that § 230
only insulated “publisher[s] or speaker[s]” from liability for third-party
content.69
The Fourth Circuit rejected Zeran’s reasoning and granted ICS AOL
immunity under § 230 from a negligence claim.70 According to the Fourth
Circuit, the statute barred all claims, not just defamation claims, stemming
from liability for third-party content.71 Like many future expansions of § 230
protections, the preference for a broad interpretation stemmed from concerns
that tort law would stifle internet speech due to government interference.72
61. 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
62. Id. at 329.
63. Compare Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc. (Zeran I), 958 F. Supp. 1124, 1127 (E.D. Va.
1997), aff’d, 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997), with Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co.,
No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710, at *4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995), superseded by statute,
Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 509, 110 Stat. 56, 137–39, as
recognized in Shiamili v. Real Est. Grp. of N.Y., Inc., 952 N.E.2d 1011 (N.Y. 2011).
64. Zeran II, 129 F.3d at 329.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Zeran I, 958 F. Supp. at 1127–28.
68. Id.
69. Zeran II, 129 F.3d at 331 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1)).
70. Id. at 328 (“[Zeran] also contends that § 230 does not apply here because his claims
arise from AOL’s alleged negligence prior to the CDA’s enactment. Section 230, however,
plainly immunizes computer service providers like AOL from liability for information that
originates with third parties.”).
71. Id. at 330 (“By its plain language, § 230 creates a federal immunity to any cause of
action that would make service providers liable for information originating with a third-party
user of the service.”). The court did, however, consider Zeran’s negligence claim to be
“indistinguishable from a garden variety defamation action.” Id. at 332.
72. See id. at 330 (“The purpose of this statutory immunity is not difficult to discern.
Congress recognized the threat that tort-based lawsuits pose to freedom of speech in the new
and burgeoning Internet medium. The imposition of tort liability on service providers for the
communications of others represented, for Congress, simply another form of intrusive
government regulation of speech. Section 230 was enacted, in part, to maintain the robust
nature of Internet communication and, accordingly, to keep government interference in the
medium to a minimum.”).

660

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89

In interpretations after Zeran, courts have applied a three-part test to
determine whether an ICS is protected under § 230, drawing from the
language of the statute. The test asks three questions of the ICS at issue: “(1)
whether the defendant qualifies as a provider of an ‘interactive computer
service,’ (2) whether the asserted claims treat the defendant as a publisher or
speaker of the information, and (3) whether the content was wholly provided
by another ‘information content provider.’”73
2. Material Contribution as a Limit to Immunity
The first case to provide an exception to the nearly unlimited expansions
of immunity by Zeran was Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v.
Roommates.com, LLC.74 The defendant in the case, Roommates.com,
matched users with potential roommates based on personal descriptions and
preferences expressed through a questionnaire.75 The Fair Housing Councils
of San Diego and San Fernando Valley brought suit against the matching
service on the grounds that, along with other state laws, the questionnaire
violated the Fair Housing Act76 (FHA) by requiring users to disclose
characteristics such as sex, family status, or sexual orientation.77 By
requesting this information, plaintiffs argued, Roommates.com expressed
discriminatory intent and discriminated in fact against users by funneling
them toward or away from profiles based on the controversial
characteristics.78
The Ninth Circuit ultimately held that an ICS could act in a way that
constituted codevelopment of third-party content and thus surrender § 230
protections.79 The court reasoned that because Roommates.com had required
the requested information of its users as a condition of participating in the
matchmaking service, it was responsible in part for the content, even though
the content consisted of third-party inputs.80 Roommates.com’s search
engine similarly fell beyond § 230 protections; because the site steered users
toward choices based on the search engine’s unlawful criteria, it “force[d]
73. Catherine Tremble, Note, Wild Westworld: Section 230 of the CDA and Social
Networks’ Use of Machine-Learning Algorithms, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 825, 847 (2017)
(footnote omitted); see, e.g., Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846, 850 (9th Cir. 2016);
see also Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 64 (2d Cir. 2019); Herrick v. Grindr LLC, 765
F. App’x 586, 589 (2d Cir. 2019); FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1196 (10th Cir.
2009); Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1100–01 (9th Cir. 2009).
74. 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
75. Id. at 1164.
76. Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
77. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1164.
78. Id. at 1165.
79. See id. at 1166.
80. Id. (“When a business enterprise extracts such information from potential customers
as a condition of accepting them as clients, it is no stretch to say that the enterprise is
responsible, at least in part, for developing that information. For the dissent to claim that the
information in such circumstances is ‘created solely by’ the customer, and that the business
has not helped in the least to develop it strains both credulity and English.” (citation omitted)
(quoting id. at 1181–82 (McKeown, J., dissenting))).
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users to participate in its discriminatory process” and was “designed to
achieve illegal ends.”81
The holding in Roommates.com had extremely narrow application. The
codevelopment activity only included prepopulating an answer field and
designing a search engine to achieve an illegal goal.82 The codevelopment
in that case only created liability when the site made direct, material
contributions to the specific illegal aspects of the content at hand.83 The
Roommates.com search engine triggered liability for illegal content because
it was designed to classify search results by protected characteristics; another
search engine that did not limit search results based on unlawful
characteristics would not trigger the same liability as Roommates.com’s
did.84 As the Ninth Circuit understood it, Google exemplified this unbiased
standard because its search engine sorted results independently of any legally
restricted preference.85
The Ninth Circuit here established an important limit on § 230’s expanding
application in Roomates.com by establishing a concrete ceiling as to how far
the definition of “publisher” could be expanded.86 This limit became stricter
in Roomates.com’s aftermath, diminishing the importance of the third prong
of the Zeran analysis: whether an ICS served as its own ICP.87 Specifically,
Roommates.com established that an ICS could still, in some situations, be
held liable under the third prong of the analysis if it created, or codeveloped,
the specific illegal aspects of third-party content.88 The court likened
development to solicitation and held that “unlawful questions solicit (a.k.a.
‘develop’) unlawful answers.”89 In other words, an ICS materially
contributes to illegal content when it conditions participation in the ICS on
its provision.90 This was why Roommates.com was not responsible for
content submitted into a blank text box but was responsible for a
prepopulated answer field.91
The Ninth Circuit outlined additional criteria on search engines in its
decision:
Roommate designed its search system so it would steer users based on the
preferences and personal characteristics that Roommate itself forces

81. Id. at 1167.
82. See id. at 1166–67.
83. See id. at 1167–68 (“We believe that both the immunity for passive conduits and the
exception for co-developers must be given their proper scope and, to that end, we interpret the
term ‘development’ as referring not merely to augmenting the content generally, but to
materially contributing to its alleged unlawfulness. In other words, a website helps to develop
unlawful content, and thus falls within the exception to section 230, if it contributes materially
to the alleged illegality of the conduct.”).
84. Id. at 1167.
85. Id.
86. See id. at 1166.
87. Tremble, supra note 73, at 845–46.
88. See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1167–68.
89. See id. at 1166.
90. See id.
91. See id. at 1174 n.38.
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subscribers to disclose. . . . Councils charge that limiting the information a
subscriber can access based on that subscriber’s protected status violates
the Fair Housing Act and state housing discrimination laws. . . . If such
screening is prohibited when practiced in person or by telephone, we see
no reason why Congress would have wanted to make it lawful to profit from
it online.92

After Roommates, an ICS may be held liable not only for soliciting illegal
content but also for designing a search engine to structure illegal results.93
3. Other Cases Limiting § 230
After Roommates.com, another major case, FTC v. Accusearch Inc.,94
arose in the Tenth Circuit and tackled the development prong of the Zeran
analysis. Defendant Accusearch operated a website, Abika.com, which
allowed users to search databases of information mostly provided by thirdparty ICPs.95 The site styled itself as an intermediary that connected paying
customers with third-party researchers’ findings.96 One of these databases
involved personal telephone records.97 Because of restrictions imposed by
the Telecommunications Act of 1996,98 anyone who obtained the records had
presumably done so illegally.99 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
accordingly brought an unfair practice claim against Accusearch for
disclosing telephone records.100
The Tenth Circuit held that Accusearch developed content when it
“specifically encourage[d] development of what is offensive about the
content” by making it more usable, visible, or active.101 Resting its decision
on the third prong of the Zeran analysis,102 the court investigated the
etymology of the word “development,” the action that renders an entity an
ICP of content, and found its “core meaning” to be the “drawing out” of
information to expand usefulness.103 The court asked whether the content
was developed through Abika.com and who was responsible for that
development.104 Exposing information to public view, the court found,
qualified as “development” of it.105 Taken in full context, the court held that

92. Id. at 1166.
93. See id.
94. 570 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2009).
95. Id. at 1191.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15,
18, and 47 of the U.S.C.).
99. Accusearch, 570 F.3d at 1192.
100. Id. at 1190.
101. Id. at 1198–99.
102. Id. at 1197.
103. Id. at 1198.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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a website collecting and publicly displaying legally problematic content
because of its legally problematic nature becomes the ICP of that content.106
In Accusearch, the public display of the telephone records constituted
development under the Tenth Circuit definition.107 The site had knowingly
solicited the phone information from researchers obtaining the data illegally
and constructed a portion of Abika.com to develop the illegal data as it came
in.108 The court therefore used a slightly broader theory than that of
Roommates.com and ruled that the site was an ICP.109
To distinguish exactly where Accusearch went wrong in developing its
content, the court compared Abika.com with the more recent actions of a
familiar defendant: AOL.110 In Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. American
Online, Inc.,111 AOL, also the defendant in Zeran, returned triumphant in a
§ 230 defense against claims of defamation and negligence.112 The plaintiff
alleged that AOL had published faulty stock prices and share volumes
associated with Ben Ezra on three separate occasions.113
AOL developed the information, but it did not seek out the faulty
information; it even requested corrections from the third-party vendor
providing the content.114 For this reason, while both Accusearch and AOL
developed the content on their sites, Accusearch was responsible for its
offensiveness, whereas AOL in Ben Ezra was not.115
The combined effect of Accusearch and Roommates.com has triggered
further liability for other defendants in the following years. In FTC v.
LeadClick Media, LLC,116 the FTC sued an affiliate marketing network for
unfair trade practices.117 The network, LeadClick, had been connecting
affiliate, LeadSpa, with fake news sites to advertise LeadSpa products.118
LeadClick had even suggested alterations to the fake news content that would
meet requests on the part of both LeadClick and LeadSpa.119 LeadClick
attempted a § 230 defense by alleging that its affiliates published the
deceptive statements as independent ICPs.120 However, the court found that
because LeadClick helped to develop the fake news sites with which it

106. Id. at 1198–99 (“[O]ne is not ‘responsible’ for the development of offensive content
if one’s conduct was neutral with respect to the offensiveness of the content (as would be the
case with the typical Internet bulletin board).”).
107. Id. at 1198.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1200.
110. Id. at 1199.
111. 206 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 2000).
112. See id. at 983.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 985.
115. Accusearch, 570 F.3d at 1199.
116. 838 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2016).
117. See id. at 167.
118. Id. at 171.
119. Id. at 167.
120. Id. at 175.
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worked, it was responsible for the deceptiveness of the content it published
and was not merely a neutral assistant or conduit.121
4. Further Expansions of § 230 Immunity
Even as courts have established boundaries to § 230 defenses, they have
also continued its broad application. In Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC,122
the First Circuit evaluated whether Backpage.com, a website that featured
advertisements for prostitutes, unlawfully promoted and profited from sex
trafficking.123 The appellants were three victims of human trafficking who
sued pseudonymously, stating that Backpage.com hosted online prostitution
The appellants alleged that the
advertisements featuring them.124
advertisements, which their traffickers posted on Backpage.com, helped
customers find and rape them over a combined 1900 times.125 They therefore
claimed both that Backpage.com encouraged sex trafficking through its
policies and that it illegally profited off of its proliferation.126
The First Circuit held for Backpage.com and stated that § 230 barred
appellants’ claims.127 The actions of Backpage.com, the court held,
constituted traditional publisher functions that barred claims arising from
their exercise.128 Even though the court acknowledged that Backpage.com’s
rules facilitated illegal conduct, the prevailing prohibition of claims based on
publishing functions occupied the court’s attention.129 The court did not,
however, address the factual question of whether Backpage.com actually
encouraged sex trafficking through its website or whether it was responsible
for the development of the alleged sex traffickers’ advertisements.130
In another case, Herrick v. Grindr LLC,131 the Second Circuit applied
§ 230 to Grindr, an application that “matches users based on their interests
and location.”132 Appellant Matthew Herrick faced a harassment campaign
in which his ex-boyfriend posted a fake profile of Herrick on Grindr and
directed Grindr users to go to his home and workplace.133 Herrick then sued
121. Id. at 176.
122. 817 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2016).
123. Id. at 16.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 17.
126. Id. at 16–17. The site was alleged to encourage sex trafficking by scrubbing metadata
from photos, not requiring the provision of a phone number or email verification, and
employing a content filter for prohibited terms that could be easily circumnavigated. Id. In
the victims’ cases, the advertisements posted also encouraged anonymous payments,
contained altered phone numbers, and used coded language signaling the availability of
underage girls. Id. at 17.
127. Id. at 24.
128. Id. at 22.
129. See id. (“We hold that claims that a website facilitates illegal conduct through its
posting rules necessarily treat the website as a publisher or speaker of content provided by
third parties and, thus, are precluded by section 230(c)(1).”).
130. Compare id., with FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2009).
131. 765 F. App’x. 586 (2d Cir. 2019).
132. Id. at 588.
133. Id.
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Grindr under several causes of action134 on the theory that Grindr’s website
lacked features to prevent impersonation or other dangerous misconduct such
as that which he experienced.135 Grindr moved to dismiss all but the
copyright infringement claims based on § 230 protections.136
The Second Circuit sided with Grindr.137 The court reasoned that Grindr
was an ICS that collected and displayed information provided exclusively by
other ICPs, namely its users.138 Grindr also successfully defeated the
appellant’s claims on the grounds that it could not be held liable for failing
to remove offensive content, i.e., exercising its ordinary editorial
functions.139 The case again did not discuss whether Grindr was responsible
for developing the content at issue140 but explained that it could not be held
responsible either way, as it only provided neutral assistance “in the form of
tools and functionality available equally to bad actors and the app’s intended
users.”141
The Sixth Circuit presented one of the broadest examples of § 230
protections in Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment Recordings LLC.142 The
Sixth Circuit characterized the website in question, www.TheDirty.com, as
“a user-generated tabloid primarily targeting nonpublic figures.”143 The
plaintiff in that case was the target of several defamatory posts and brought
an action in federal court against the site and its owners for defamation, libel
per se, false light, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.144
The Dirty generated very little of its own content, instead relying primarily
on user-generated content for the site.145 The moderators’ curation of the site
only entailed deletion to ensure “nudity, obscenity, threats of violence,
profanity, and racial slurs are removed” in a method not dissimilar to that in
Prodigy Services.146 Moderators would occasionally mark a post with their
own brief comments, distinguished from user-generated content with
boldface.147

134. These included “negligence, deceptive business practices and false advertising,
intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, failure to warn, and negligent
misrepresentation.” Id. An amended complaint also added causes of action for “products
liability, negligent design, promissory estoppel, fraud, and copyright infringement.” Id. at 589.
135. Id. at 588.
136. Id. at 589.
137. Id. at 591.
138. Id. at 589–90.
139. Id. at 591.
140. Compare id., with FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2009).
141. Herrick, 765 F. App’x. at 591.
142. 755 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 2014).
143. Id. at 401.
144. Id. at 401–02.
145. Id. at 402.
146. Compare id. at 403, with Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94,
1995 WL 323710, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995), superseded by statute,
Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 509, 110 Stat. 56, 137–39, as
recognized in Shiamili v. Real Est. Grp. of N.Y., Inc., 952 N.E.2d 1011 (N.Y. 2011).
147. Jones, 755 F.3d at 403.
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The Sixth Circuit, after realizing that The Dirty had developed the
defamatory content at issue, then asked whether it was responsible for the
development (the same two questions posed in Accusearch).148 Because the
site was neutral as to the content it asked parties to submit, never asked users
to submit defamatory information explicitly, and never suggested that it only
published defamation, the Sixth Circuit held that it was not responsible for
the defamation in user posts.149 While the court found The Dirty responsible
for its own comments, the comments themselves contributed nothing new to
the defamation that third parties had already volunteered.150
Most recently, the Second Circuit upheld § 230 protections for Facebook
in Force v. Facebook, Inc.151 That case began with five attacks by Hamas
on Americans in Israel between 2014 and 2016, resulting in the deaths of four
American citizens.152 The appellants, which included one survivor and
representatives of the estates of the others, brought multiple claims against
the site,153 alleging that Facebook aided Hamas in the attacks when its
algorithm helped Hamas spread incitement to potential terrorists and when
the site failed to enforce official guidelines prohibiting the use of Facebook
by designated foreign terrorist organizations.154 Facebook, the appellants
argued, had developed the terrorists’ online network.155
The appellants attempted several new arguments to demonstrate how
Facebook’s role exceeded that of a publisher. They argued that Facebook’s
“matchmaking” role between users and content did not constitute a form of
publishing156 and that the Facebook algorithm’s automation of traditional
editorial functions removes it from the traditional scope of publishing.157
They also argued that Facebook had become its own ICP by “developing”
Hamas propaganda and making it more visible to users through the news
feed.158
The Second Circuit disagreed with the appellants’ analysis.159
Matchmaking, as long as it was performed through tools neutral to the alleged
offensiveness of the content, replicated “an essential result of publishing” in
the eyes of the court,160 although the Second Circuit acknowledged that the
matchmaking was possibly made more efficient through Facebook’s

148. See id. at 409.
149. Id. at 415–16.
150. Id. at 416–17.
151. 934 F.3d 53, 63 (2d Cir. 2019).
152. Id. at 57–58.
153. Id. at 61 (“Plaintiffs claimed that . . . Facebook was civilly liable for aiding and
abetting Hamas’s acts of international terrorism; conspiring with Hamas in furtherance of acts
of international terrorism; providing material support to terrorists; and providing material
support to a designated foreign terrorist organization.”).
154. See id. at 59.
155. Id. at 61.
156. Id. at 65.
157. Id. at 67.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 71.
160. Id. at 66.
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system.161 The use of an algorithm, the court explained, was irrelevant so
long as a third party provided “the essential published content.”162 As for
the argument that Facebook was its own ICP, the court imposed its own
interpretation of the “material contribution test” implemented in LeadClick
and Roommates.com.163 Unlike the Tenth Circuit in Accusearch, the Second
Circuit cited a D.C. Circuit case164 to assert that a website did not “cross the
line into content development” by making information available for public
display.165 Even if it developed content by displaying it, use of a neutral
algorithm would protect it from liability: “Merely arranging and displaying
others’ content to users of Facebook through such algorithms—even if the
content is not actively sought by those users—is not enough to hold Facebook
responsible as the ‘develop[er]’ or ‘creat[or]’ of that content.”166
As the Second Circuit case indicates, recommendation systems, such as
those employed by Facebook, are generally insulated from liability by
§ 230.167 There is, however, some discrepancy within the case law
interpreting § 230 as to the third prong of the Zeran analysis168 and what line
renders an ICS its own ICP of offensive content. More specifically, courts
disagree on what constitutes “development.” In Accusearch, the Tenth
Circuit held that websites develop content by making it more available than
it otherwise would be. The question there is whether a site is responsible for
that development in some way, which includes indirect measures, such as
solicitation,169 as well as direct measures, such as creating the choices for
users to select.170 The view favoring broader § 230 application, recently held
by the Second Circuit, requires direct, material contribution to the illegal
aspects of the content,171 similar to the direct micromanagement of fake news
sites in LeadClick.172
While courts have begun applying these standards to AOL bulletin boards
and roommate matchmaking sites, the nature of the internet entities raising
§ 230 defenses has changed dramatically. Whether development stems only
from direct contribution or comes from public display and creates a question
of responsibility, the answers to these questions require a broader
understanding of the recommendation algorithms ultimately handling the
content at issue. Aside from a surface-level aesthetic resemblance to the
161. Id. at 67.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 68 (“[A] defendant will not be considered to have developed third-party content
unless the defendant directly and ‘materially’ contributed to what made the content itself
‘unlawful.’”).
164. Marshall’s Locksmith Serv. Inc. v. Google, LLC, 925 F.3d 1263, 1266 (D.C. Cir.
2019).
165. Force, 934 F.3d at 69.
166. Id. at 70.
167. See id.
168. See supra note 71.
169. FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1198–99 (10th Cir. 2009).
170. See Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157, 1166, 1174 n.38 (9th Cir.
2008) (en banc).
171. Force, 934 F.3d at 68.
172. FTC v. LeadClick Media, LLC, 838 F.3d 158, 176 (2d Cir. 2016).
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Prodigy Services bulletin board, recommendation feeds of the 2010s employ
vastly different strategies that may have greater relevance for § 230.
C. The Rise of the Recommendation Feed
Today’s algorithms are far from entirely passive conduits and can make
extremely personal inferences about users’ lives. Indeed, service providers
of all kinds, even beyond the internet, have been able to exploit this
abundance of data in various ways as an emerging market.173 Retailers such
as Target have been able to leverage this data to build deep insights into their
customers’ lives. For instance, a recommendation algorithm even as far back
as 2012 could predict a customer’s pregnancy based on shopping habits.174
One group of online services that has grown around these insights is social
media providers, which can be defined as the subcategory of ICSs whose
services allow for the creation and distribution of third-party content to
network socially.175 While the phrase describes a broad range of sites, a
growing subcategory of these, such as Facebook, employs a machinelearning algorithm176 that bases its content displays on how likely a user is
to engage with a given post in that display, among other factors.177 The
algorithmic sorting most often manifests itself in a displayed compilation of
relevant information.178 Examples of these recommendation systems include
the Facebook News Feed179 and Twitter feeds.180 Unlike the chat room
services that were protected in cases like Stratton, which functioned similarly
to online bulletin boards, these website features compose an independent
compilation of resources based on your likelihood to engage with them.181
What distinguishes a modern social media algorithm from the Prodigy
Services bulletin board, among other things, is the more advanced and
173. See JOHN GANTZ & DAVID REISEL, INT’L DATA CORP., THE DIGITAL UNIVERSE IN 2020:
BIG DATA, BIGGER DIGITAL SHADOWS, AND BIGGEST GROWTH IN THE FAR EAST 16 (2012),
https://www.speicherguide.de/download/dokus/IDC-Digital-Universe-Studie-iView11.12.pdf [https://perma.cc/DX59-3GLV] (“Big Data is going to be a big boon for the IT
industry. Web sites that gather significant data need to find ways to monetize this asset. . . .
Further, companies that deliver the most creative and meaningful ways to display the results
of Big Data analytics will be coveted and sought after.”).
174. See Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb 16,
2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html?searchResult
Position=3 [https://perma.cc/7CZX-CYX2].
175. Social Media, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
social%20media [https://perma.cc/75TR-8PJG] (last visited Oct. 3, 2020).
176. See Tremble, supra note 73, at 838–40.
177. See AJ Agrawal, What Do Social Media Algorithms Mean for You?, FORBES (Apr. 20,
2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ajagrawal/2016/04/20/what-do-social-media-algorithms
-mean-for-you/#17720dcfa515 [https://perma.cc/HLC4-7E3N].
178. See id.
179. How News Feed Works, supra note 34.
180. See Twitter Ads Targeting, TWITTER BUS. https://business.twitter.com/en/advertising/
targeting.html [https://perma.cc/3MGP-R9VL] (last visited Oct. 3, 2020).
181. See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710, at
*4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995), superseded by statute, Communications Decency Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 509, 110 Stat. 56, 137–39, as recognized in Shiamili v. Real Est.
Grp. of N.Y., Inc., 952 N.E.2d 1011 (N.Y. 2011); How News Feed Works, supra note 34.
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complex programming of the ICS’s interactive service.182 Consequently, it
is necessary to explore, on a basic level, how current advances differ from
the message boards § 230 originally contemplated.
The Prodigy Services model provides context for services legislators might
have expected to protect, as well as the actions to which they may have
intended § 230 to apply.183 Prodigy Services operated several bulletin boards
where almost two million users communicated through posts.184 The site
also contracted “Board Leaders” who also posted on the bulletin boards.185
The Board Leaders enforced community guidelines (which the plaintiffs
labeled as standards of editorial control) via an “emergency delete function”
by which the leaders could remove problematic content.186 The bulletin
board also employed a rudimentary program that automatically screened
postings for offensive language.187 Aside from the posts of board leaders,
Prodigy Services made no positive contributions to its users’ posts; its only
“editorial” actions were blocking offensive content and deleting posts that
violated user guidelines.188
Modern social media differs from the bulletin boards of Prodigy’s day in
several ways but perhaps most prominently through the implementation of
algorithmically generated content.189 Instead of users posting material to a
neutral bulletin board, an algorithm sorts the massive volume of content
available to display and creates a custom feed based on what each individual
user is most likely to engage with.190 The generated feed is unique for every
user, based on their own personal interactions with the site.191
All such feeds, such as YouTube’s “recommended” tabs, the Facebook
News Feed, or Twitter’s timeline, so long as they are managed by a computer
program, fall into a broad category called recommendation systems.192
These systems can themselves be sorted into three categories;193

182. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
183. See GOODMAN & WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 4.
184. Stratton, 1995 WL 323710, at *3.
185. Id.
186. Id. at *3, *5–6.
187. Id. at *5.
188. See id.
189. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
190. See How News Feed Works, supra note 34.
191. Will Oremus, Who Really Controls What You See in Your Facebook Feed—and Why
They Keep Changing It, SLATE (Jan. 3, 2016, 8:02 PM), https://www.slate.com/articles/
technology/cover_story/2016/01/how_facebook_s_news_feed_algorithm_works.html
[https://perma.cc/3FRM-22LK].
192. See generally Maxim Naumov et al., Deep Learning Recommendation Model for
Personalization and Recommendation Systems (May 31, 2019) (unpublished manuscript),
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1906.00091.pdf [https://perma.cc/LNB7-2P5H].
193. Gabriel Chartrand et al., Deep Learning: A Primer for Radiologists, 37
RADIOGRAPHICS 2113, 2114–15 (2017). Chartrand et al. list four categories, but the fourth
category, deep learning, is a subset of the third one, representation learning. For the purposes
of this Note, the distinction between representation learning and deep learning is immaterial.
As applied to a recommendation system, both refer to a mostly or fully automated process that
sorts content from third-party ICPs into categories of its own making.
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understanding the basis of these categories is necessary to understand how
§ 230 applies to them.
The first category, generic rules-based artificial intelligence (AI), consists
of a stable, unchanging computer program that turns an input into an
output.194 An example of such a program would be an online bulletin board
or even a screening device for posts, such as the programs used by the
defendants in Stratton.195 The court in Stratton held that such a program
would normally constitute the exercise of editorial discretion, triggering
liability as a publisher in a defamation suit,196 but the context and legislative
history of § 230 show that the law was meant to eliminate that liability.197
Such a program would not, at least in theory, itself violate the third prong of
Zeran by any court’s standard because, while possibly “developing” the
content by generating the display,198 it does not materially contribute to the
illegal aspect of a defamatory post.199 Unless the rules-based AI were
somehow programmed to itself contain offensive elements (as was the case
in Roommates.com),200 its programmer would not be responsible for the
offensiveness of third-party content it displayed.
The second category, classic machine learning, is a subset of AI that
changes over time to most efficiently perform a task.201 In a recommendation
system, this usually entails a human identifying trends in data and feeding
those data to an AI.202 When users engage with that data, for example, by
“liking” a social media post, the machine-learning AI can classify them
concerning their responses to the data, altering an output to fit their past
preferences in future iterations of the same process.203 Apple News
exemplifies this system on a basic level.204 Editors handpick and categorize
stories and feed them into the recommendation system connected to an
application on user devices.205 The recommendation system is a classic
194. See id. at 2114.
195. Compare Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL
323710, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995), superseded by statute, Communications Decency
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 509, 110 Stat. 56, 137–39, as recognized in Shiamili v.
Real Est. Grp. of N.Y., Inc., 952 N.E.2d 1011 (N.Y. 2011) (explaining how Prodigy’s
screening program filtered user posts for explicit appearances of objectionable words), with
Chartrand et al., supra note 193, at 2115 (describing a rules-based AI as entirely composed of
an explicit computer program).
196. Stratton, 1995 WL 323710, at *4 (“By actively utilizing technology and manpower to
delete notes from its computer bulletin boards on the basis of offensiveness and ‘bad taste’,
for example, PRODIGY is clearly making decisions as to content . . . and such decisions
constitute editorial control.”).
197. See S. REP. NO. 104-230, at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
198. FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1198 (10th Cir. 2009).
199. See Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1166–67 (9th Cir.
2008) (en banc).
200. See id.
201. See Chartrand et al., supra note 193, at 2115.
202. Id.
203. See Naumov et al., supra note 192.
204. See generally APPLE NEWS+, https://www.apple.com/apple-news/ [https://perma.cc/
TK88-ZA6J] (last visited Oct. 3, 2020).
205. Id.
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machine-learning algorithm;206 as users sort through stories and expose
preferences for one category over another, the algorithm “learns” about those
preferred categories and prioritizes them in future recommendations.207
The third category, representation learning, operates as a subset of classic
machine learning in which the AI self-categorizes raw user data to best obtain
a predetermined goal without independent human assistance.208 While third
parties can still input and categorize data, the algorithm not only sorts its own
data based on user preferences but also divines those user preferences based
on its own interpretation.209
In Force, the appellants alleged, and the Second Circuit agreed, that the
Facebook algorithm amounted to an automation of decision-making by the
platform.210 As the dissent noted, the categories by which Facebook sorts
content are created and modified by the algorithm to at least some degree to
best achieve its intended goals.211 Facebook does in fact generate its
advertising categories on its own, although it can still manually tweak those
categories when they promote offensive content.212 As a recommendation
system that creates its own categories as gleaned from user input to best
construct its News Feed, Facebook’s algorithm is a form of representation
learning.213
Specifically, Facebook’s programmers want to employ deep learning
regarding most user-contributed content.214 A subset of representation
learning, deep learning identifies simple features of third-party content as
features within the more complex categories that the algorithm creates.215
Commonly used in image classification or facial recognition programs, deep
learning works by “picking out edges first, then circles, then faces.”216 In
206. Id. (“Apple News only uses on-device intelligence to recommend stories . . . .”).
207. Id. (“As you read, Apple News gets a better read on your interests, then suggests
relevant stories.”).
208. See Chartrand et al., supra note 193, at 2114.
209. See id.
210. Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 68 (2d Cir. 2019).
211. Id. at 85 (discussing how Facebook’s algorithm created the category “Hitler did
nothing wrong,” among others, to maximize content engagement, and automatically modified
the anti-Semitic category to include Second Amendment supporters); see also Julia Angwin
et al., Facebook Enabled Advertisers to Reach ‘Jew Haters,’ PROPUBLICA (Sept. 14, 2017,
4:00 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-enabled-advertisers-to-reach-jewhaters [https://perma.cc/HG2N-J2PV].
212. See Angwin et al., supra note 211.
213. See Chartrand et al., supra note 193, at 2114.
214. See generally Naumov et al., supra note 192. Facebook has recently implemented
new features to promote reliable news sources over known sources of fake news. The changes
do not constitute a change to the central Facebook News Feed but rather the creation of an
alternative “Facebook News” feature that exists separately from the recommendation system
that this Note discusses and is, therefore, outside the scope of this Note. See Gerry Smith &
Sarah Frier, Facebook Launches News Section to Compensate Publishers, BLOOMBERG (Oct.
25, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-10-25/facebookcreates-news-section-to-compensate-restive-publishers [https://perma.cc/57AG-9S6A].
215. See Chartrand et al., supra note 193, at 2115.
216. Gideon Lewis-Kraus, The Great A.I. Awakening, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Dec. 14, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/14/magazine/the-great-ai-awakening.html
[https://perma.cc/B62Y-BRK5].
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one of the earlier examples of true deep learning, a Google AI, after viewing
millions of YouTube still frames, had taught itself what cats are and how to
identify them.217 The AI had never been previously educated on what a cat
is.218 Since its initial AI achievement, Google also managed to apply deep
learning to Google Translate, better improving recommended translations to
suit what their users are most likely searching for.219
D. Problems Created by § 230’s Expansion
Section 230 has been hailed by supporters as “the twenty-six words that
created the internet.”220 The statute aimed, in its own words, to promote the
development of the internet and protect free market innovation from the
stifling effects of defamation liability, as seen in Stratton.221 In many
respects, these policy goals have been achieved. Internet usage has climbed
from 52 percent of the U.S. population in 2000 to about 90 percent in 2019.222
Racial gaps in pure internet access have also narrowed significantly, though
they persist in subtler forms, such as smartphone dependence.223 While only
about 1 percent of U.S. adults had home broadband internet access in 2000,
almost three-quarters do today and an additional one in five accesses home
internet exclusively through a smartphone.224 Social media sites, consisting
only of nascent bulletin boards when § 230 was first passed, produce and
collect massive amounts of data, which has opened up new economic
opportunities both in the United States and abroad.225 Facebook is now
arguably the second largest news provider in the United States; in the United
Kingdom, Facebook, Google, and Twitter all fall into the top ten.226 The
shift to online news consumption has effectively broken the brand loyalty
bubbles of traditional news sources, the ICPs of the pre-internet world.227
With the collapse of those bubbles, internet users have accessed an even
217. Id.; see also Quoc V. Le et al., Building High-Level Features Using Large Scale
Unsupervised Learning, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 29TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
MACHINE LEARNING 507, 507 (2012) (“The focus of this work is to build high-level, class
speciﬁc feature detectors from unlabeled images.”).
218. See Lewis-Kraus, supra note 216.
219. Id.
220. See generally JEFF KOSSEFF, THE TWENTY-SIX WORDS THAT CREATED THE INTERNET
(2019).
221. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b).
222. Internet/Broadband Fact Sheet, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 12, 2019), https://www.
pewresearch.org/internet/fact-sheet/internet-broadband [https://perma.cc/HVU2-583Y].
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. See generally GANTZ & REISEL, supra note 173.
226. GEORGE J. STIGLER CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF THE ECON. & THE STATE, STIGLER
COMMITTEE ON DIGITAL PLATFORMS: FINAL REPORT 9 (2019) [hereinafter STIGLER REPORT],
https://www.chicagobooth.edu/research/stigler/news-and-media/committee-on-digitalplatforms-final-report [https://perma.cc/Q75Z-PTGZ].
227. Id. at 156 (“Recent studies of audience news consumption behavior have indicated
that news users increasingly rely on multiple news media and seem to shop for the best news
across outlets online. As a consequence, they follow the news on multiple media platforms.
It has been well-documented that the Internet has reduced loyalty to any single outlet, in
particular for technological reasons.”).
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greater free market of information than ever before, empowering formerly
underrepresented and concealed voices in a way that exceeds even the
diversity of thought that emerged before FCC regulations ensured corporate
dominance of radio broadcasts in the late 1920s.228
For defamation law, the transformation has posed a unique problem.
Under traditional defamation law, the medium in which a defamatory
statement was published had significant bearing on how the publisher
experienced liability for it.229 A printed work, for instance, triggered heavier
damages than everyday speech because courts viewed print’s permanence as
more severely damaging than a fleeting slanderous remark.230 Television
and radio, which disseminated the formerly less harmful spoken word to
millions, triggered new debates about damages, ultimately being treated as
involving more serious libel because of their destructive potential.231
Online defamation defies many assumptions made by traditional
defamation law. For instance, the creator and disseminator of tortious
content (other than the ICS) might be a fake or anonymous profile who
proves nearly impossible to unmask.232 In Igbonwa’s case, the plaintiff could
not pursue defamation claims against the “faceless men” who defamed him
for this very reason.233 Where an ICS is shielded from liability, but also
shields the third-party ICPs through display of an alias, a unique problem
arises of how to unmask the tortfeasor. A court can order a content provider
to disclose an anonymous user’s information,234 but this process is often
more complex than it seems. Where a user employs an alias, the user’s
identity would have to be determined via an IP address, an internet user’s
unique signature based on connection point.235 Obtaining the IP address
through a court could prove costly, time-consuming, and possibly fruitless;
if the tortfeasor connected through a public router used by many people or
through another person’s private router, the IP address narrows the list of
possible culprits but cannot identify the tortfeasor.236 More determined
parties can even employ a virtual private network (VPN), which can render
them nearly impossible to find even by the ICS, let alone the court system.237
228. See generally ELENA RAZLOGOVA, THE LISTENER’S VOICE: EARLY RADIO AND THE
AMERICAN PUBLIC (2011). The Federal Communications Commission’s regulation of radio
encouraged a shift from niche stations serving niche audiences to larger corporate stations
serving broader ones, the reverse of what recommendation systems encourage.
229. See Ciolli, supra note 15, at 141–43.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 143–44.
232. See generally Ronen Perry & Tal Z. Zarski, Who Should Be Liable for Online
Anonymous Defamation?, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 162, 165 (2015).
233. See Igbonwa v. Facebook, Inc., No. 18-cv-02027, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173769, at
*18–22 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2018).
234. Perry & Zarski, supra note 232, at 165.
235. Id. at 166.
236. Id.
237. Compare Daiyuu Nobori & Yasushi Shinjo, VPN Gate, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 11TH
USENIX SYMPOSIUM ON NETWORKED SYSTEMS DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 229, 235
(2014) (“Without a packets logging function, criminals could abuse VPN Gate to hide their
client IP addresses. When a criminal uses a VPN server, the owner can pass packets logs to a
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Victims facing such obstacles may never be able to discover their tortfeasors.
Even in successful cases, the financial burden for courts and plaintiffs
dramatically increases the cost of making the victim whole.238
Beyond the individual level, the entities that most benefit from § 230 have
produced significant negative externalities as the spread of unverifiable
information and “fake news” generally have become a serious issue on a
national and even global scale.239 Even when news sources are not
intentionally producing fake news, the fragmentation of news sites’
audiences by the proliferation of social media aggregators has decreased the
incentive to produce costly, well-researched reporting when the product can
be copied in minutes, rendering any profit motive pointless.240
While the conversation about unverifiable information online has centered
on fake news, and specifically the 2016 presidential election,241 the problem
of rapidly spreading false information about private individuals has received
less attention, despite being palpable as early as the first case to involve a
§ 230 defense.242 Information shared on social media is typically detached
from clear association with any site besides the recommendation feed of
choice and may generally be seen as more trustworthy if shared by a person’s
friend, rather than by a reliable source.243 The resulting potential for the
spread of misinformation has been compared by prominent scholars to that
of medieval Europe; rather than trust verified information from objective
experts, consumers trust information shared by friends that reflects their own
subjective beliefs.244 In short, the ability to produce information about
anyone, by anyone, is rapidly escalating just as the economic incentive to
produce thoroughly researched and trustworthy information about anyone,
by anyone, is disappearing. The resulting civilizational crisis in faith has led
many to seriously contemplate life in a “post-truth society.”245

law enforcement agency. The ‘VPN Gate Anti-Abuse Policy’ on the web site clearly states
that each VPN Gate server records packet logs in order to prevent such abuse.”), with No-Log
VPN Service, NORDVPN, https://nordvpn.com/features/strict-no-logs-policy [https://
perma.cc/LSQ6-G82D] (last visited Oct. 3, 2020) (“We do not store connection timestamps,
session information, used bandwidth, traffic data, IP addresses, or other data.”).
238. See Perry & Zarski, supra note 232, at 166.
239. See generally STIGLER REPORT, supra note 226.
240. Id. at 156–57.
241. See generally Andrea Butler, Protecting the Democratic Role of the Press: A Legal
Solution to Fake News, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 419 (2018).
242. See Zeran I, 958 F. Supp. 1124, 1127 (E.D. Va. 1997), aff’d, 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir.
1997).
243. See generally Oren Livio and Jonathan Cohen, ‘Fool Me Once, Shame on You’:
Direct Personal Experience and Media Trust, 19 JOURNALISM 684 (2018).
244. STIGLER REPORT, supra note 226, at 165–66 (“Lack of transparency and use of native
advertising are said by consumers to make them less trusting of the media. . . . Just as they
did in the Middle Ages, audiences trust information that is familiar and/or comes from
friends.” (footnotes omitted)).
245. See S. I. Strong, Alternative Facts and the Post-truth Society: Meeting the Challenge,
165 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 137, 137–38 (2017); see, e.g., Shanto Iyengar & Douglas S.
Massey, Scientific Communication in a Post-truth Society, 116 PNAS 151 (2019); Molly
Worthen, The Evangelical Roots of Our Post-truth Society, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2017),
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Section 230 aimed to spur innovation in a free market of internet
communication,246 but in the process, it helped drive the growth of its
corresponding downsides,247 while also raising the bar for everyday people
to find protection against a wave of misinformation about themselves.248
Even when plaintiffs overcome the hurdle of § 230 and successfully bring
suit against a third-party ICP, judgment-proof defendants who lack the
personal resources to compensate a victim’s loss often provide their own
systemic bar to recovery. 249
With data production from social media use increasing exponentially in
recent years, § 230’s limitations on liability for ICSs generally, and social
media sites specifically, will likely only produce more victims who find
defamation law virtually useless to aid them.250 The organizations that have
empowered this change and are arguably most responsible for the crisis are
also immunized from liability by the same statute that allowed them to
develop.251
The current situation has led to growing pushback against broad
interpretations of § 230.252 Because the statute has been construed so
broadly, proposals to address its shortcomings tend to focus on amending the
statute rather than salvaging it.253 Both Republicans254 and Democrats255
have proposed that § 230 should be amended to rein in its broad application
by the courts. Many of these reforms, however, embrace irreconcilable ideas
that are unlikely to find bipartisan appeal beyond the recognition that § 230
is somehow flawed.256 Some legislators, recognizing the growing prevalence
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/13/opinion/sunday/the-evangelical-roots-of-our-posttruth-society.html [https://perma.cc/GD5B-8UY5].
246. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b).
247. See generally STIGLER REPORT, supra note 226, at 156–57.
248. See, e.g., Perry & Zarski, supra note 232, at 165–66.
249. See Salina Tariq, Revenge: Free of “Charge?,” 17 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 227,
228 (2014).
250. ANTONIO GARCÍA MARTÍNEZ, CHAOS MONKEYS: OBSCENE FORTUNE AND RANDOM
FAILURE IN SILICON VALLEY 506–07 (2016). García Martínez, a former Facebook product
manager, who has also been an adviser to Twitter, discusses what is essentially § 230
immunity as the reason for expanding misinformation at every social level, although he cites
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, a source of related immunity in copyright, as the cause.
251. Id. at 507.
252. See Sylvain, supra note 52; see also Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 76 (2d Cir.
2019) (Katzmann, J., dissenting); Butler, supra note 241.
253. See, e.g., Butler, supra note 241 (proposing an amendment to § 230 to expand
defamation liability); see also GOODMAN & WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 8.
254. Ending Support for Internet Censorship Act, S. 1914, 116th Cong. (2019) (proposing
that § 230 protections be suspended for social media companies “unless the social media
company obtains certification from the Federal Trade Commission that it does not moderate
information on its platform in a manner that is biased against a political party, candidate, or
viewpoint”).
255. GOODMAN & WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 1 (discussing how House of
Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi and Representative Adam Schiff have both called for
reforms to § 230 as a grant of power without responsibility).
256. Id. at 6 (“While it is true that Section 230 is increasingly a bipartisan issue, proposals
to reform it are often attempting to achieve irreconcilable goals. Many recent ones are
designed to encourage firms to adopt greater responsibility for policing their platforms, either
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of online defamation, want to expand platforms’ incentives to moderate and
censor their users as a countermeasure.257 Other legislators, fearful of the
growing dominance of ICSs over news and platforming decisions, want to
cut back protections in a way that limits their moderation capabilities.258
President Donald Trump has adopted a goal of pushing the latter view
through executive order, but such a move could well be seen as an attempt
by the executive branch to overturn long-standing judicial precedent.259 This
difficult reality calls into question whether § 230 may be somehow salvaged
by the courts themselves without changing the text of the statute or existing
legal precedent. Could courts instead apply current interpretations of § 230
in a way that more accurately reflects the role recommendation systems
behind the massive social media aggregators of our time handle the thirdparty content that they then distribute to the public?
II. POSSIBLE APPLICATIONS OF § 230 TO A RECOMMENDATION SYSTEM
This part discusses the potential arguments for and against the application
of § 230 immunity to recommendation systems directly. Using Facebook as
a case study, Part II.B explores potential arguments for why a
recommendation system such as the Facebook News Feed should face
liability as the ICP of its own material. Part II.C poses potential problems
with those arguments, as well as corresponding arguments against limiting
§ 230’s expansive reach.
A. Parameters of the Discussion: Facebook as a Case Study
Section 230’s protections touch a broad spectrum of internet services, from
advertisers260 to search engines.261 Even limiting the scope of a discussion
about possible § 230 reforms to recommendation systems, such systems
come in various levels of complexity262 and apply to different platforms with
different designs.263 Part II of this Note focuses on how § 230 interpretations
would apply to the representation-learning algorithmic recommendation
systems, using the Facebook News Feed as its anecdotal focus.

through the creation of additional exceptions to Section 230’s immunity, or through the
establishment of preconditions for immunity. Other proposals aim to limit the amount of
moderation platforms can employ. There are also important differences in whether the
proposals seek to shape platform content ex ante with new content-based Section 230
exceptions or to condition immunity after the fact based on platform reasonableness or
processes.”).
257. Id. at 6.
258. Id.
259. Maggie Haberman & Kate Cronger, Trump Prepares Order to Limit Social Media
Companies’ Protections, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/
05/28/us/politics/trump-executive-order-social-media.html [https://perma.cc/BY9B-P7DR].
260. FTC v. LeadClick Media, LLC, 838 F.3d 158, 176 (2d Cir. 2016).
261. Marshall’s Locksmith Serv. Inc. v. Google, LLC, 925 F.3d 1263, 1266 (D.C. Cir.
2019).
262. See supra notes 190–213 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 175–78 and accompanying text.
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This Note selects Facebook as its recommendation system of choice to
analyze for several reasons. First, Facebook has found itself to be the
lightning rod for regulators’ attention to the recommendation systems at
issue.264 Second, its 2.7 billion users comprise more than a third of the global
population.265 Third, as the already massive proliferation of data accessible
through social media is only projected to increase,266 a fully automated
recommendation system like that used in Facebook’s News Feed will likely
be not only ideal but necessary to operate a functioning social media site in
the 2020s and beyond.267
B. Arguments for Limiting § 230 Immunity
Given the many problems created by § 230 and the limited probability of
meaningful amendment, this Note considers interpretations of § 230 that can
salvage the statute as it stands. Most of these involve applying § 230 with a
more comprehensive understanding of how a recommendation system differs
from an online bulletin board.
1. Applying Roommates.com and Accusearch Directly to Facebook’s
Current Practices
The Facebook algorithm might have a more complex result than that of
Roommate.com’s search engine but operates on the same basic principles:
the recommendation system filters through a content pool based on the
categorization of individual elements within that pool and presents the user
with a result.268 The main difference between the two stems from the source
of the categories. On Roommate.com, users categorized themselves based
on categories preselected by the website’s human operators.269 On
Facebook, users are categorized by the recommendation system itself in an
entirely automated process.270 Based on a user’s interactions with posts the
algorithm recognizes as involving “football,” for example, Facebook may
categorize that user as a “football fan” and feed the user more content
involving football.271
264. Marcy Gordan, From Toast of Town to Toxic: Facebook CEO on Outs with Dems,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 4, 2019), https://apnews.com/article/f9cbd0627e4a4a90a778d5b
819967cda [https://perma.cc/4RUT-UDCJ ]; see also Adam Satariano, Facebook Dodged a
Bullet from the F.T.C. It Faces Many More., N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2019), https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/07/13/technology/facebook-privacy-investigations.html?search
ResultPosition=9 [https://perma.cc/EP8J-PNGM].
265. Mike Isaac, Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg Says He’ll Shift Focus to Users’ Privacy,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/06/technology/markzuckerberg-facebook-privacy.html?searchResultPosition=1 [https://perma.cc/JE37-SPX5].
266. GANTZ & REISEL, supra note 173, at 1 (“From now until 2020, the digital universe will
about double every two years.”).
267. See Sylvain, supra note 52.
268. See Oremus, supra note 191.
269. Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 2008) (en
banc).
270. How News Feed Works, supra note 34.
271. See id.
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Because Facebook’s categories are automatically generated to meet the
goals of its algorithm, problematic categories have appeared on its site in the
past, generating bad publicity for the company.272 Facebook has even ended
up in the same troublesome situation as Roommate.com by targeting
advertisements based on race, though it has since made changes to avoid
violating antidiscrimination laws like the FHA.273 The site currently
employs a comprehensive nondiscrimination policy for advertisers.274 Even
with § 230 protections intact, the social media giant understood that its
protections would not extend if their recommendation system materially
contributed to third-party violations of the FHA by designing a different
News Feed for people of different races.275
This understanding could possibly revive some of the protections of
defamation law when the same logic is applied to defamation. If Facebook
theoretically targeted pieces of content that are identifiably defamatory to
users most likely to engage with defamation, then, by the holding of
Accusearch—that a website is responsible for its content if it specifically
encourages what generates liability—it would be responsible for the
defamation; it “developed” content by sending it to a third party and was
responsible for doing so because its algorithm sought out defamatory
material.276 Courts could even distinguish such a situation from that in
Jones; in that case, the moderators reposted user submissions regardless of
their defamatory nature.277 Unlike the moderators of The Dirty, such a
situation would mean Facebook’s algorithm objectively knew the content
was defamatory and chose it for that purpose.278
Such a hypothetical would make an interesting thought experiment if it
were not already somewhat true. Facebook’s Ad Manager tool allows any
customer to create and market an advertisement to selected audiences,
limiting and expanding the scope of targeted recipients by various traits.279
One such category of interests, “Slander,” is described as “people who have
expressed an interest in or like pages related to Slander.”280 Therefore,
Facebook’s current algorithm might unambiguously target third-party
272. Angwin et al., supra note 211.
273. See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1157; Sapna Maheshwari & Mike Isaac, Facebook
Will Stop Some Ads from Targeting Users by Race, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/12/business/media/facebook-will-stop-some-ads-fromtargeting-users-by-race.html?searchResultPosition=1 [https://perma.cc/S5YP-FAWZ].
274. Advertising Policies: Prohibited Content, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/
policies/ads/prohibited_content/discriminatory_practices [https://perma.cc/T5GJ-2ZES] (last
visited Oct. 3, 2020).
275. See Maheshwari & Isaac, supra note 273.
276. See FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1198–2000 (10th Cir. 2009).
277. Jones v. Dirty World Enter. Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 403 (6th Cir. 2014).
278. Id.
279. Business Help Center: About Ad Creation in Ads Manager, FACEBOOK FOR BUS.,
https://www.facebook.com/business/help/282701548912119?id=649869995454285
[https://perma.cc/ZQ24-SKEW] (last visited Oct. 3, 2020).
280. Id. Upon creating a Facebook page and a corresponding ad, if one clicks the “Edit”
button next to the “Detailed Targeting” category and types “slander” into the resulting text
box, hovering over the category reveals the description.
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content to potential recipients because of their expressed interest in slander,
fulfilling the hypothetical this Note outlines.281 In addition to this category,
Facebook also gives advertisers the option to allow “targeting expansion” in
which Facebook can automatically expand content reach to new categories
not selected by the advertisers.282 One of these categories, presumably,
would be slander.
With regard to content labeled with the “slander” category or something
similar (“libel” or even “defamation”), the argument for liability would be a
relatively straightforward one: because Facebook developed content by
making it publicly available and was responsible for its development by
seeking out defamatory content to display, it became an ICP of that specific
piece of content even though it did not create it, just as Accusearch became
an ICP of its phone records even though it did not itself obtain them.283
2. Removing Protections by a Second Creation Point
While Judge Robert Katzmann’s lone dissent in Force focused on
Facebook’s potential to influence actions beyond the scope of internet speech
(which the Third Circuit has already recognized as a valid exception to § 230
immunity),284 he touches on a detail distinguishing the Facebook algorithm
from the Prodigy message boards: there is a second point of creation between
a third-party posting a Facebook status and a user’s reception of that
content.285 Under the third prong of the Zeran analysis, an ICS that creates
or provides its own content cannot receive protection under § 230 from
liability for that content.286 By creating the recommendation feed and
customizing content for individual users, Facebook adds another level of
development to user posts, for which it is almost entirely responsible.287
Facebook would therefore be the ICP of that additional level of development.
Suits against Facebook and other sites failing to overcome the § 230
defense generally focus on assailing an individual third-party contribution,
or a collection of disaggregated third-party contributions, as themselves
impetuses for liability for the ICS.288 Such cases typically fail because, if
Facebook is assumed to be a neutral collector and displayer of information,
it cannot be said to be responsible for the content at issue.289

281. Id.
282. Business Help Center:
About Targeting Expansion, FACEBOOK FOR BUS.,
https://www.facebook.com/business/help/128066880933676?id=176276233019487
[https://perma.cc/GR6J-GRGH] (last visited Oct. 3. 2020).
283. See FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1198–2000 (10th Cir. 2009).
284. Oberdorf v. Amazon.com Inc., 930 F.3d 136, 153 (3d Cir. 2019).
285. Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 76 (2d Cir. 2019) (Katzmann, J., dissenting).
286. See supra Part I.B.2.
287. See supra Part I.B.3 (identifying development as a universal action performed by
every ICS, with the material question being whether the ICS was responsible for that
development).
288. See, e.g., Force, 934 F.3d at 66–67.
289. Id.
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Facebook’s recommendation system is anything but a neutral conduit.
Through the design of its programmers and the evolution of its
representation-learning algorithm, it can send different content to different
people based on its own categories and target audiences.290 Facebook can
even influence the behavior of its users, who are its ICPs, through its
design.291 The questions then arise of whether Facebook develops the
content processed through that design and whether it is responsible for that
development.292
The divide between circuit interpretations of development here becomes
important. The Tenth Circuit held in Accusearch that all websites “develop”
content by hosting it for public display.293 By this definition, the only
question remaining is whether the site is responsible for the development of
the offensive content.294 Other courts, such as the Second Circuit, have held
that the display of information alone does not constitute development.295
Instead, the Second Circuit holds that development only occurs when an
intermediary is not neutral with respect to the offensive trait of the content at
issue.296 In other words, development only occurs when an intermediary
distinguishes between offensive content and all other content.297
All of these questions, however, become irrelevant if the News Feed itself
is thought of as its own product. Facebook, understandably, closely guards
its algorithm as its property.298 The News Feed is arguably a product of
Facebook; it cannot be produced by any other source.299 The Facebook News
Feed would be empty if not for the provision of third-party content, but third
parties themselves likewise cannot produce it.300
In copyright law, compilations of third-party content are treated as the
intellectual property of their compilers so long as they contain a modicum of
originality. As outlined in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone
Service Co.,301 an original selection of facts is eligible for copyright, though
the copyright would then be limited to the arrangement and not the facts
copyrighted.302 In a world where Facebook does not qualify as an ICS, the
compilation of content to best match user interests would result in millions,

290. How News Feed Works, supra note 34; see also Michal Lavi, Evil Nudges, 21 VAND.
J. ENT. & TECH. L. 4, 18–20 (2018) (discussing the various ways in which the design of social
networks can influence the dissemination of information).
291. Lavi, supra note 290, at 20.
292. See FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1198–99 (10th Cir. 2009).
293. Id.
294. See id. at 1199.
295. Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 70 (2d Cir. 2019).
296. See id. at 69.
297. Id.
298. Oremus, supra note 191.
299. See id.
300. See id.
301. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
302. Id. at 350–51.
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if not billions, of personalized, copyrightable original publications,303
analogous to the creation of a personalized physical newspaper.304
This informs the § 230 analysis because it clarifies a legal precedent that
Facebook’s content emerges from two points of creation or development.305
The first development point occurs when the Facebook user, presumably by
free choice,306 contributes content to the site voluntarily by posting or sharing
the content of another.307 The second point of development, classified by
some as a publishing function308 and others as development of equal
import,309 occurs when Facebook displays the content on a user’s feed. If a
website displays all content in a neutral fashion, the circuits agree that there
should be no responsibility for that content.310 The question is whether, at
the second development point, a website is responsible for not just
developing content but developing the illegal aspect of that content.311 If
Facebook developed a post not categorized as defamation (or slander),312
which still was, in fact, defamation, should it then be absolved of
responsibility for that development?
A deep-learning algorithm sorts content by categories, but those categories
are not magically distilled from thin air; they are the more complex
interpretations of simpler traits.313 In recognizing a face, for instance, an
image-categorizing, deep-learning AI might first categorize edges, then
categorize shapes, including circles, based on combinations of edges, and
then understand combinations of shapes to be a face.314 Even if Facebook
barred all categories of defamation, slander, libel, or other related words from
being used as categories of representation, the system would still categorize
content based on the foundational elements that it formerly categorized as
defamation because those elements still exist.315 In the image categorization
example from Google, if an image had whiskers, pointy ears, fur, four legs,
and two eyes, that creature might be categorized as a “cat.”316 If Google
intervened with an order barring all categorization of image search results as

303. See generally id.; How News Feed Works, supra note 34.
304. Cass R. Sunstein, #REPUBLIC: DIVIDED DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF SOCIAL MEDIA 1–
3 (2017) (calling Facebook, as well as Twitter and Google, a close approximation to the “Daily
Me” personal newspaper predicted in 1995 by technology specialist Nicholas Negroponte);
see also STIGLER REPORT, supra note 226, at 9 (calling Facebook the second largest news
provider in the United States).
305. See FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1198–99 (10th Cir. 2009).
306. See Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1166, 1174 n.38
(9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). But see generally Lavi, supra note 290 (arguing that design patterns
of a website can substantially erode a user’s free will in content creation).
307. How News Feed Works, supra note 34.
308. See Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 68 (2d Cir. 2019).
309. See Accusearch, 570 F.3d at 1198–99.
310. See supra Part I.B.
311. Accusearch, 570 F.3d at 1198–99.
312. See supra Part II.B.1.
313. Chartrand et al., supra note 193, at 2115.
314. Lewis-Kraus, supra note 216.
315. See id.; see also Chartrand et al., supra note 193, at 2115.
316. Lewis-Kraus, supra note 216.
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“cat,” the images would still be classified as commonly containing similar
whiskers, pointy ears, fur, legs, and eyes.317
What this means is that even if Facebook were to take the surface-level
measure of banning a category, its site would still adapt to prioritize
defamation, just in another form; the existence of a presumably
autogenerated slander category further evidences this.318 Facebook has, in
its past, considered legal ramifications in structuring its product.319 If the
problem of intensive defamation spreading by algorithm persists past an easy
fix, not only could § 230 immunity not apply but it may provide an impetus
for systematic change to better control the site’s flow of information.
3. Facebook Should Be Responsible for Its ICPs’ Actions
The theory behind § 230 protections for Facebook is a simple one: it
should not be held liable for information contributed to its site by a third
party.320 The text of § 230 embraces this rationale in no uncertain terms.321
Courts have nonetheless found that § 230 liability ought not apply when a
site is “responsible” for the development, even by a third party; this theory
has already defeated the third prong of the Zeran analysis in past cases.322
In a situation where users freely decide of their own volition what to post
or advertise, solicitation is not usually an issue.323 Such an interpretation
squares with the text of § 230, which applies explicitly to content for which
an ICS has no responsibility.324 This may not be the case with many modern
websites, where the ICS and its users are not isolated actors interacting
tangentially with each other, but two parties in a relationship that affects both
involved.325 Through both “dark patterns” obscuring user choice326 and “evil
nudges” pushing users in directions that the recommendation system
desires,327 user actions on Facebook may not entirely be the product of their
own intentions. The recommendation algorithm, in part, is “learning” from
user “preferences” that might have originated from the design of the
website,328 or even the algorithm itself,329 rather than the user. This is
simultaneously analogous to the limitation of user choice in
317. See supra notes 305–08.
318. See infra Part II.B.1.
319. GARCÍA MARTÍNEZ, supra note 250, at 507. García Martínez discusses how he was
“constantly sprinting half-blind through a minefield of potential legal problems . . . . and
trying to find some legal rubric that would forgive (or at least defensibly excuse) our next
depredation with user data.” Id. at 317; see also Isaac, supra note 265; Satariano, supra note
264.
320. See Sylvain, supra note 52.
321. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c).
322. See supra Part I.B.
323. See supra Part I.B.
324. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c).
325. Lavi, supra note 290, at 18–20.
326. STIGLER REPORT, supra note 226, at 210.
327. Lavi, supra note 290, at 18–20.
328. Id.
329. Id.
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Roommates.com330 and the solicitation in Accusearch;331 if users’ actions are
mostly shaped by the design of a site, they are not acting in full independence,
and Facebook, not the user, is the ICP of that content.
The idea that free will of consumers can be manipulated by small nudges
is by no means a novel one or one confined to the internet. Exposing a focus
group to a lesson on habit formation, for instance, can dramatically increase
time spent exercising.332 The chime of a smartphone notification likewise
serves as a nudge to check emails, even if the user wants to focus on working
undisturbed.333 The nudges are not always obvious connections to that which
they nudge; environmental factors such as geographic location can greatly
“nudge” certain individuals to commit crimes, for example.334
Like any other business, a social media site can use nudges and dark
patterns to trigger desired outcomes.335 Dark patterns in this setting refer to
website structures that either distract users from doing something or
manipulate them into acting in some way.336 A common, if simple, example
of this might be where a website prominently places an “accept” button for a
newsletter and subtly places a “decline” option. Another dark pattern may
appear to require acceptance of the newsletter to continue browsing a site,
even if that is not the case.337
With the extreme personal knowledge that modern recommendation
systems have of their users, more sophisticated dark patterns can not only
target users with advertisements but also with nudges to create or share
desired content.338 An extremely basic example of this would be Facebook
“reacts.”339 At least one former executive of the site has remarked that
because engagement with the content a user posts on Facebook triggers
reward centers in the brain, bad actors can manipulate user choices by
exploiting patterns that lead to more engagement.340
Whether or not Facebook intentionally prompts its users to spread
defamation in order to increase user engagement, it may not have to.
Falsehoods spread through online social networks “significantly farther
330. See Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1166, 1174 n.38
(9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
331. See FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1198–99 (10th Cir. 2009).
332. Duhigg, supra note 174.
333. Id.
334. JOHN F. PFAFF, SENTENCING LAW AND POLICY 216–17 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds.,
2016).
335. See Lavi, supra note 290, at 18–20.
336. STIGLER REPORT, supra note 226, at 237.
337. Id. at 238.
338. See Amy B. Wang, Former Facebook VP Says Social Media Is Destroying Society
with ‘Dopamine-Driven Feedback Loops,’ WASH. POST (Dec. 12, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/12/12/former-facebook-vp-sayssocial-media-is-destroying-society-with-dopamine-driven-feedback-loops [https://perma.cc/
R9NV-7DNT].
339. See id. (reporting on Facebook’s former vice president for user growth’s remarks that
Facebook employs “dopamine-driven feedback loops” to exploit users); see also Duhigg,
supra note 174.
340. See Wang, supra note 338.
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faster, deeper, and more broadly than the truth.”341 This sharing bias for false
information, presumably because of its novelty,342 persists even when a
social network’s design does not intentionally encourage it.343 A social
media post becomes “novel” when it contrasts with previously existing
information; false rumors, which are usually significantly more “novel” than
true rumors, may be more likely to be shared by users when the corpus of
information they have been exposed to contradicts the false rumor.344
Fact-checking and other efforts to promote “true information,” which have
little to no effect on their own,345 try to remedy the prevalence of false rumors
by promoting truthful, verified content for users to share and engage with.346
While novelty may not be the only factor that causes false rumors to spread
faster than truthful content, novel information is more likely to be shared,
and falsehoods are more likely to be novel.347 An ICS that did not interfere
at all would still see the spread of false rumors faster than truthful ones.348
By promoting verified content, be it news or statements about individuals,
the ICS expands the corpus of truthful information seen by the average
reader, even if the reforms only apply to a small minority of users.349
Novelty, however, has a correlative relationship with the existing corpus of
contrasting information the user has seen.350 Efforts to dominate the
Facebook News Feed with verified information may then produce a perverse
effect by expanding the novelty of and therefore user engagement with
defamation.351
C. Arguments for Extending Immunity
Despite the many problems created by § 230’s expansion, refusing its
protections to recommendation systems would face some opposition. This
section discusses alternative views of the recommendation system, the legal
issues with questioning user agency as an ICP, and the potential broader
policy issues of refusing § 230 immunity to recommendation systems.

341. Lavi, supra note 290, at 20; see also Soroush Vosoughi et al., The Spread of True and
False News Online, 359 SCIENCE 1146, 1146 (2018) (finding that false tweets spread faster
than true tweets).
342. Vosoughi et al., supra note 341, at 1149.
343. Id. at 1150 (“The greater likelihood of people to retweet falsity more than the truth is
what drives the spread of false news, despite network and individual factors that favor the
truth.”).
344. Id. at 1149–50.
345. STIGLER REPORT, supra note 226, at 166.
346. See, e.g., Smith & Frier, supra note 214.
347. Vosoughi et al., supra note 341, at 1150.
348. Id.
349. Smith & Frier, supra note 214 (“[I]t’s better to have a separate tab, which will
definitely draw a smaller audience, maybe 10% to 20% of the main feed, but that will still be
significant.”).
350. Vosoughi et al., supra note 341, at 1150 (“The last two [novelty] metrics measure
differences between probability distributions representing the topical content of the incoming
tweet and the corpus of previous tweets to which users were exposed.”).
351. See supra notes 337–42 and accompanying text.
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1. Applying Roommates.com to Individual User Posts
No matter how the mechanics and constructs of a recommendation system
are defined and analyzed, one concrete fact weighs solidly against the
incursion of liability: if the individual fragments of a recommendation
system’s resulting display that were manipulated, distributed, and compiled
by the site originate with a third-party post.352 In Roommates.com, potential
liability for the operation of a recommendation algorithm came from a series
of prepopulated answers originating from a drop-down field.353 Such broad
choice presented to a user would not ordinarily create liability for an ICS.354
While a drop-down menu of illegal categories is not usually presented to
a user, the use of a recommendation system can complicate the matter
because an algorithm or human expert can sort users and posts into categories
that they have not chosen.355 Dark patterns and similar phenomena may
make it harder for a user to control what their news feed contains, but the
user can still ultimately control their Facebook News Feed.356 Users can hide
content they dislike and request to see less of it in the future.
The recommendation algorithm largely sorts information based on user
activity within the site, which the user agrees to provide to Facebook when it
uses the site.357 Beyond some basic information, such as a telephone number
and name, Facebook requires nothing of a user before they start using
Facebook and voluntarily surrendering their preferences and desires by
navigating the site.358 Regarding the “slander” category of advertising, the
situation is not that Facebook seeks out slander to send unwitting users.
Users demonstrate their willingness to engage with slander by making
choices in what content to engage with. In response to the demonstrated user
preference, Facebook’s automated recommendation system responds to the
user’s expressed desires.359 The user, at least in part, is responsible for the
defamatory content in the user’s own News Feed.
The News Feed might also be considered a choice of presentation, rather
than an individual compilation; this was the argument embraced by Force.360
The Facebook algorithm, proprietary or not, is an algorithm choosing how to
arrange individual pieces of content in the Facebook News Feed. The
Facebook user can also request changes in an individual News Feed, which
the algorithm then responds to by changing content in the future.361

352.
353.
banc).
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.

How News Feed Works, supra note 34.
Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1166 (9th Cir. 2008) (en
Id. at 1174 n.38.
How News Feed Works, supra note 34.
Id.
Id.
Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 70 (2d Cir. 2019).
How News Feed Works, supra note 34.
Force, 934 F.3d at 70.
How News Feed Works, supra note 34.
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2. The ICP’s Ultimate Responsibility for Offensive Content
Dark patterns and nudges aside, the Facebook user exercises ultimate
control over what is posted on the site. All pieces of content begin with what
is essentially a blank box; users can contribute defamatory statements to the
site and may even be encouraged to by the site’s design but by no means are
they required to.362 Courts that have rejected “nudge” arguments have
generally done so on these grounds.363
The Sixth Circuit’s protection of The Dirty provides the best example of
this counter to nudge arguments.364 So long as websites do not develop user
content because of its problematic nature and do not contribute anything
problematic to the content at issue, they act neutrally regarding their hosted
content.365 The Dirty posted defamatory content, but the content originated
almost entirely from third parties and that which did not, the Sixth Circuit
held, was not defamatory.366 While, The Dirty did, however, republish
defamatory information from other ICPs, some have called § 230 protections
for such behavior a full repudiation of tort law’s applicability to
republication.367 As courts have already built the framework of § 230 around
eliminating the republication rule, third-party liability for defamatory content
of users becomes nearly impossible unless the content at issue originated
explicitly from the ICS that hosted it.368
3. Further Limits on § 230 Immunity Will Offend Speech Concerns
Part of the purpose of § 230 was to preserve a free and open marketplace
of ideas and to spur online innovation. This intent resided so saliently in the
minds of legislators that it found its own place in the statute.369 These same
concerns were also what drove the adoption of an extremely expansive
reading of the statute in Zeran.370 These interpretations have furthermore
driven the development of an information economy built around § 230
immunity.371 A court’s attempt to reverse this trend in a meaningful way, be
it through algorithm liability or applying § 230 to “evil nudges,” might prove
impractical to the extent that the modern economy has embraced its

362. See id.
363. See, e.g., GW Equity LLC v. Xcentric Ventures LLC, No. 07-CV-976, 2009 WL
62173, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 2009); Whitney Info. Network, Inc. v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC,
No. 04-CV-47-FtM-34, 2008 WL 450095, at *11 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 15, 2008); see also Jones v.
Dirty World Enter. Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 403 (6th Cir. 2014).
364. Jones, 755 F.3d at 403.
365. See supra Part I.B.3.
366. Jones, 755 F.3d at 403.
367. See Zipursky, supra note 13, at 14–16.
368. Id.
369. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b).
370. Zeran II, 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).
371. STIGLER REPORT, supra note 226, at 156–57.

2020]

PROGRAMMED DEFAMATION

687

immunity.372 Modern means of communication may have advanced so far
that a correction would only come at a massive cost to society.373
There are also concerns that, under the existing interpretations of § 230 as
limited by cases like Roommates.com and Accusearch, ICSs are dissuaded
from the exact sort of Good Samaritan moderation of their content that § 230
was intended to encourage.374 Further limitations on § 230 immunity would
inevitably trigger greater pains by ICSs to avoid that liability, driving § 230
even further from accomplishing one of its original goals.375 Every online
recommendation system that would lose liability under the new regime could
then be prevented from implementing the good faith moderation § 230 and
its backers sought to encourage.376 Recall that technology has advanced, and
more data is being created and processed than ever before in human
history.377 Section 230, in part, aims to promote the development of
technologies to simultaneously encourage and control the massive flow of
information.378 For two decades, these advancements have occurred under a
§ 230 immunity regime. A sudden change in that regime could render those
advancements legally impractical and economically irreplaceable but in a far
more advanced cyberspace. Online providers might strive to look more like
CompuServe, the defendant in Cubby (the companion case to Stratton).379 In
that case, CompuServe avoided liability by passing the buck of moderation
duties to a third party.380
A similar initiative, if it emerged today, could devastate the prospects of
recovery for plaintiffs in defamation suits involving a recommendation
system. If a Cubby-style case developed today, it might not result in a
curbing of online defamation but rather its proliferation, as tortfeasors run
wild in unregulated online spaces.381 Such tortfeasors might still frequently
operate under an aliases or otherwise render themselves impossible to
discover.382 When found, they would still be more frequently judgmentproof383 than the parties who actually benefited, via website traffic, from the
defamatory content.384 In other words, the problems a proponent of liability
372. GARCÍA MARTÍNEZ, supra note 250, at 508–10 (giving the opinion that modern media
has adapted so far in the direction of “new Media Medievalism” that navigation of the new
normal, rather than a reversion, is the most practical path of technological development).
373. See id.
374. See Tariq, supra note 249, at 237 (“Under this analysis, most websites, including
‘MyEx.com,’ clearly foresee that most information on their site will be non-consensual in
nature, enjoy CDA immunity as long as all they do is provide space for vengeful posts, such
as offensive texts, images and videos, and do not actively participate in forming the content
themselves.”).
375. GOODMAN & WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 9.
376. See supra notes 371–73 and accompanying text.
377. See generally GANTZ & REISEL, supra note 173.
378. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c).
379. See Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
380. See id.
381. See GOODMAN & WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 9.
382. See generally Perry & Zarski, supra note 232.
383. See generally id.
384. See Tariq, supra note 249, at 237.
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for recommendation systems would hope to solve might end up worsened,
not improved, as ICSs adapt to the updated § 230.
III. A PROPOSED REFINEMENT OF § 230 IMMUNITY
This part discusses a refinement of § 230 interpretations that could resolve
some legal and policy problems caused by the statute without amending it
and while also limiting negative consequences. After discussing the
foundations of the proposal, it explains the legal viability of adopting this
view in future interpretations of the statute, before analyzing its broader
impact on society at large.
A. Foundations of the Proposal
When legislators drafted and passed § 230, they aimed to protect
incentives for innovation in navigating the unexplored frontier of the
internet.385 They saw the potential that tort law, as it existed, could stifle
technological innovation in the way of establishing a free and
unprecedentedly broad market of information for the republic and by
extension block that potential achievement through the courts.386 Since
§ 230’s passage, the internet titans of our time have brought about some
version of the future those representatives sought. The technologies they
created can not only help humans navigate cyberspace but do so by
themselves faster than any human could hope to.387 The result has been a
technological revolution, opening not only metaphorical free markets of
information but literal markets of economic opportunity.388
In the midst of this innovation, however, new technologies have surpassed
what legislators or judges in 1996 addressed in drafting § 230. Section 230
arose from a fear that legal precedent would stifle innovation and leave the
internet otherwise completely vulnerable to an onslaught of objectionable
material.389 The objectionable material in question came primarily from
third-party posters, who had no affiliation with the websites they engaged
with. Section 230 responded by restricting liability for those third-party ICPs
attributable to the computer services that hosted them.390
The measure made sense when the line between content provider and
content host was as clear as who posted what on a bulletin board. As online
services broadened and grew more complex, however, the lines began to blur,
and courts have stepped in to refine the emerging gray area between original
ICS product and third-party contribution.391 The emerging rule became that
where an ICS was responsible for the development of content through its

385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.

See supra Part I.A.2.
See supra Part I.A.2.
See supra Part I.C.
See supra Part I.D.
See supra Part I.A.2.; see also Sylvain, supra note 52.
See supra Part I.A.3.
See supra Parts I.B.2–3.
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service, be it by encouragement or direct contribution, it could act as the
provider of its own information content.392
The two conceptualizations of development, exemplified by the Tenth and
Second Circuits, are relevant only for structuring the third prong of the Zeran
analysis. One side poses that a website develops all content it displays,
regardless of what other actions it takes; it becomes responsible for that
content when it specifically encourages illegal or tortious aspects.393 The
other side essentially dodges the question of development, holding that a
website cannot develop content until it materially contributes to the same
problematic aspects.394 Of course, a website can develop content under the
second conception in completely acceptable ways; it only loses its
protections from liability as a developer when it develops illegality.395 The
second standard’s phrasing creates more confusion than the first but,
understood properly, they should accomplish the same result. The relevant
question is whether, in the development of content, an ICS contributed to the
aspect of the content at issue that creates liability.
Even with this clarification, a narrower gray zone remains: what
constitutes contribution? What § 230’s drafters conceived of as a wilderness
of information yet untamed has become, in many cases, a highly tailored and
curated space.396 Access to the wider internet also increasingly flows
through such spaces, giving the curators more leverage over where and how
that information spreads.397 Far from needing encouragement to develop
content moderation systems, an ICS can now exercise extensive control over
what types of information its users will see.398 The curation systems § 230
incentivized are now so far advanced that ICS users have little to no control
over where their contributed content goes.399 Commentators have even
called into question whether the users exert full control over their content
even at the creation stage.400
A deep-learning recommendation system falls into the new gray area. Not
only does it develop content by displaying it, but it takes the further step of
deciding to whom it will be displayed.401 While the users create fragments
of content, the algorithm assembles those fragments into unique compilations
based on users’ prior tastes.402 Those compilations, in Facebook’s case, the
News Feed, can then run against established legal norms about

392. See supra Part I.B.2.
393. See supra notes 291–92 and accompanying text.
394. See supra notes 293–96 and accompanying text.
395. See supra notes 293–95 and accompanying text.
396. See supra Part II.B.3.
397. Adrienne LaFrance, Facebook Is Eating the Internet, ATLANTIC (Apr. 29, 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/04/facebook-is-eating-theinternet/391766/ [https://perma.cc/NZ85-J863].
398. See supra Parts I.C, II.B.3.
399. See supra Part I.C.
400. See supra Part II.B.3.
401. See supra Part I.C.
402. See supra Part I.C.; see also How News Feed Works, supra note 34.
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defamation.403 Where defamation is shared, the relevant question, again, is:
who is responsible?404
B. A Proposed Interpretation: Algorithm as ICP
A recommendation system has multiple components. These involve thirdparty content, the recommendation algorithm itself, and a display feed of
recommendations, like a news feed.405 Each of these must be independently
created and inserted into the system for it to work. Thus, they should be
analyzed as separate products. Third-party content, unless solicited or
prompted in some way by an ICS,406 stems from a third party. The algorithm
itself is developed and operated by the ICS. The resulting feed is a blend of
the efforts of the two; the third-party content is sorted into a compilation by
the ICS itself. To call this an equal effort, however, would not accurately
reflect the process. With the minor exception of advertising, the algorithm,
and not the user, controls exactly to whom content is displayed (unless the
user bypasses the algorithm entirely by posting it on someone’s profile).407
The recommendation feed, however, can pinpoint exact subsets of
individuals most receptive to specific types of third-party compilations.408 A
user post’s destination is entirely at the mercy of the algorithm’s
recommendation feed.409 Consequently, the recommendation system is
almost entirely responsible when its recommendation feeds favor the
inclusion of defamatory content, and interpretations of § 230 should be
modified to reflect this reality.
The Ninth Circuit has already established that a search engine can trigger
liability for its owner if it acts in a way that would be illegal had a person
done it.410 The individual pieces of content in a social media site are created
by users, but most of their reach will come from the site’s recommendation
algorithm, not user effort.411 The modern process of posting content online
less resembles speaking than convincing an omnipotent machine to speak on
your behalf. Where an algorithm picks and chooses which content to display
based on its tortious or illegal effect, § 230 should not be construed to protect
its ICS owner.
Section 230 incentivized the development of tools to encourage the good
faith moderation of an undeveloped cyberspace frontier.412 If applied to
Facebook’s News Feed, § 230 would protect the most efficient catalysts for
defamation ever created. Even ignoring the manifold problems of online
defamation, such as unidentifiable defendants, ICSs cause almost all the
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.

See supra Parts II.B.1–2.
See supra notes 291–95 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.C.
See generally FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2009).
See supra Part II.B.2.
See supra Part I.C.
See supra Part I.C.
See supra Part I.C.
See supra Part II.B.2.
See supra Part I.A.2.
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development an online libel will receive.413 Because of this, an ICS that
spreads defamation should be considered the ICP of that content, especially
where it uses it to create defamatory feeds of information.414
C. The Broader Impact of This Proposal
Policy considerations also favor the treatment of recommendation systems
as ICPs. While § 230 promoted the development of a new free market of
information, the system that has since emerged expanded the reach of all
information, true or false.415 Because the new internet favors false but novel
information over verifiable but familiar information, recommendation
systems that have sprung up under § 230’s protection have not only
undermined the economic incentive for truthful reporting but also opened the
door for widespread misinformation about anyone, anytime, anywhere.416
Much has been discussed about the growing national and global problem of
“fake news” and its impact on the republic, but equally important are the
problems of individual rumors, defamation, and the impact on those targeted
by them.417 The problems may even intertwine when the trustworthiness of
news is affected more by trust in the third-party poster than in the news outlet
that published the original story.418
Limiting § 230’s protections for recommendation systems could force a
change of course in the developing misinformation epidemic. Faced with
legal consequences for actively promoting misinformation, social media
developers will be forced to consider a more careful course of development.
Instead of “move fast and break things,”419 new technological innovations
will have to avoid actively promoting defamatory material.420 Because
removing defamatory categories of information and users might not actually
change the spread of defamation,421 the required shift in technology might be
significant and potentially costly.422 To justify such a shift economically,
one need only review the logic behind § 230’s original creation:
technological innovation to solve a problem will better progress if the law
allows it.423 As of now, data is extremely profitable, and multiple decades
of development have gone into the current course of exploiting that data.424
Limiting § 230’s protections where recommendation systems are
fundamentally responsible for defamation could raise the cost of continuing
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on the current course of development enough to incentivize the creation of a
more trustworthy alternative.425
Holding against some recommendation systems might lead to concerns
about tortfeasors running wild in a newly unregulated space. After all, if the
current technologies for curation and moderation developed with the
assumption of § 230 immunity, removing those protections would also set
back efforts at content moderation.426 Such fears, however, ignore the reality
that those allegedly protective systems help, not hinder, online defamation’s
spread.427 Removing protections for these wolves in sheep’s clothing would
not exacerbate the power vacuum of inadequate moderation even in the short
term; if anything, its immediate effect would be to curtail it. Without the
ability to continue a system that promotes defamation, the absolute worstcase scenario would be reversion to a wholly unregulated space, which,
though not working against tortfeasors, would also avoid supporting them.428
The immediate effect of this would be to reduce the spread of defamation by
removing an algorithmic incentive to include it in select news feeds.
D. Limits of This Proposal
Although this Note’s proposed treatment of recommendation systems has
broad implications for the world of technology, its reach has limits. The
Sixth Circuit demonstrated those limits in its holding for The Dirty. Where
an ICS is responsible for the spread of defamation, it can, and should, be
liable for that spread.429 Sometimes, however, an ICS develops defamatory
content in a neutral way—that is, without regard to its potential as a tort.430
The Dirty, which engaged in good faith moderation for extreme obscenity
but otherwise posted whatever content users submitted, acted neutrally
towards that content’s defamation.431 The site never encouraged actual
defamation (though it encouraged gossip and “dirt”) or added defamation
beyond what the third-party user initially provided.432
This Note proposes applying § 230 to recommendation systems because
of their active role in targeting defamatory statements by inserting them into
larger, intentionally defamatory recommendation feeds. Where an ICS
merely develops the content at issue without favoring it because of its
defamation, it should still qualify for § 230 protections, even where it
otherwise exercises some editorial discretion. To say otherwise would defeat
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the original purpose of § 230 and would likely require amending the statute
to properly bring about the change.433
CONCLUSION
Since its passage, § 230 has done much good and accomplished part of its
original goal of encouraging innovation for ICSs.434 It has also, however,
contributed to many issues of growing importance that define our time.435
By recognizing the true nature of recommendation systems and treating them
as the independent products they are, courts have the power to repair some
of these issues by restoring a legal incentive for modern social media to better
observe the traditional republication rule.436
In the case that opened this Note, plaintiff Igbonwa focused on finding the
“faceless men” who ruined his life.437 While a third party posted the content,
it was Facebook who took that content, identified the users most likely to
appreciate it, and created News Feed with its own proprietary algorithm to
maximize spread.438 While Igbonwa’s case is a small one, it should elicit
great concern. Anyone can encounter the faceless men. Anyone might now
wake up one morning to find their reputation ruined, their career destroyed,
and their social circle alienated by a malevolent or even careless actor, a
possibility created by the modern recommendation feed, which does most of
the work.439 To help combat this modern crisis and preserve the
effectiveness of defamation law, courts should recognize the responsibility
for development those systems bear, deny them § 230’s protections, and,
where necessary, hold them accountable.
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